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PETER BERCK & GLORIA E. HELFAND*
The Case of Markets versus Standards
for Pollution Policy
ABSTRACT
Market-based incentives (MBI) for pollution control (pollution
taxes, subsidies for abatement, and marketable emissions permits)
have gained attention and increased in use in recent years, due to
their potential for achieving the same emissions goals as
traditional "command and control" (CAC) (also known as
standards) approaches at lower cost. This article reviews the
evidence of the superiority of MBI relative to CAC. While MBI
will achieve a specified emissions level at lower cost, their ability
to achieve the same environmental effectiveness is not always
certain, and the "commodification" of the environment associated
with MBI raises ethical concerns among some.
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 included the
innovative idea of a market for sulfur dioxide emissions. 1 Under this
system, an electric utility that emits sulfur dioxide must have a permit
for each ton of sulfur dioxide it emits.2 While emissions nationally are
being reduced substantially, any particular utility is given a choice over
the amount that it emits. An initial endowment of permits is free; a
utility can then buy permits if it emits more than that endowment, or it
can sell permits if it can reduce its emissions below that endowment.3
The overall cap on the number of permits available ensures
environmental gains; the ability to buy and sell permits, by encouraging
reductions where they are least expensive, lowers the cost of achieving
those gains.
In contrast, the traditional regulatory method for emissions
reduction has required all sources of pollution to meet specific emissions
limitations or to use specific technologies. For instance, the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments require the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) to set a number of industry-specific rules, such as "control
techniques guidelines" for reducing emissions of volatile organic
* Peter Berck is Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University
of California at Berkeley. Gloria E. Helfand is Associate Professor of Environmental
Economics in the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of
Michigan. Senior authorship is shared equally between them.
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 408(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(g) (2000).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 403(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b).
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compounds from the aerospace coatings and solvents industry. 4 This
method, sometimes called command and control (CAC) or a standards
approach, requires the same behavior of each source in a category.
Although sources can vary widely-by technology, for instance-CAC
does not provide for variations in the standard to be met.
A cap-and-trade permit system, as described above, sounds like
a situation where everyone wins compared to CAC: the environment,
through the lower cap; and emitters, for lower costs than if they were all
required to reduce by the same proportion. Title IV of the Clean Air Act
is often cited as a great success to be emulated. 5 Marketable permits of
this kind have been proposed in the Kyoto Treaty to reduce the effects of
climate change and as part of the "Clear Skies" initiative from President
George W. Bush. 6 Marketable permits are one type of so-called market-
based incentives (MBI). For the purposes of this article, MBI are policies
that force reduction in overall emissions but use price incentives, rather
than quantity restrictions, to achieve that reduction.7 These policies
include pollution taxes (such as the carbon tax briefly proposed by
President Bill Clinton in 1993), subsidies for abatement (such as the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's Environmental Quality Incentives Program,
which offers incentive payments for farmers to install conservation
practices), and marketable permits (such as the sulfur dioxide trading
program under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990).
Despite the apparent desirability of the marketable permit
system, the approach has been called into question. The Office of the
Inspector General of the USEPA issued a report critical of state-based
marketable permit programs for air pollution in New Jersey and
4. OFF. AIR & RADIATION, U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENT PROVISIONS RELATED TO SPECIFIC STATIONARY SOURCE CATEGORIES, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/gen/stasor.txt (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
5. Robert N. Stavins, Wat Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from
S0 2 Allowance Trading, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 69; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiative (2002), at http://
www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/pdfs/clear-skiesfactsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
6. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 5, art. 17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/
L.7/Add.1 (1997), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (last
visited May 25, 2005); Clear Skies Act of 2005, S. 131, 109th Cong. § 404 (2005).
7. The general category of market approaches to pollution control often includes
policies that encourage, but do not require, abatement by sources; these include programs
that provide technical assistance to aid sources in reducing emissions (such as EPA's 33/50,
Green Lights, and other pollution prevention programs) and requirements for provision of
information on emissions (such as the Toxic Release Inventory, which requires firms only
to report their emissions). Because pollution abatement is voluntary in these programs,
they are not included in this study.
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Michigan. 8 The nonprofit Clean Air Trust issued a report on marketable
permits arguing "that there are inherent in the approach flaws that
cannot be overcome, even with careful design and oversight." 9 Both
these reports maintain that marketable permit schemes pose problems
for achievement of environmental goals. Whether these problems are
insurmountable is the remaining question.
With the rise of interest in MBI and the simultaneous increased
questioning of their merits, it is an appropriate time to ask whether MBI
are an approach to environmental regulation inherently superior to
CAC, or whether there might still be situations where CAC serves a
useful role. The choice of regulatory instrument can have significant
effects both on the costs of a regulation and on the environmental
effectiveness of the regulation. This article argues that neither MBI nor
CAC always dominates the other in achieving these two objectives.
While MBI can reduce regulatory costs, they often are not as
environmentally effective as CAC.
I. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL MODEL
Since the environmental legislation of the 1970s, pollution
reduction has been effected primarily by standards. For example, the
Clean Air Act set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
that dictate the minimum level of air quality nationwide in the United
States for six so-called criteria pollutants.10 Achieving these ambient
standards required that states develop implementation plans for local
facilities." New sources of pollution are required to meet federally set
New Source Performance Standards that specify emissions limits for
facilities of different types.12 Motor vehicles face specific emissions
standards based on their type. 13 The use of standards has contributed to
8. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPEN MARKET TRADING
PROGRAM FOR AIR EMISSIONS NEEDS STRENGTHENING, Rep. No. 2002-P-00019 (2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/2002/omt.pdf (last visited May 25,
2005).
9. CURTIS A. MOORE, MARKETING FAILURE: THE EXPERIENCE WITH AIR POLLUTION
TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003), draft available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
hepg/Papers/MooreMarketing.Failure.Air.Pollution.trading.US1-03.pdf (last visited
May 25,2005).
10. Clean Air Act § 109,42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
11. Id. § 124,42 U.S.C. § 7424.
12. Id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
13. Id. § 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
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enormous gains in environmental quality since the beginning of their
use.
14
Standards apply to classes of sources. Any source that fits into a
specified category must meet the standard associated with it. For each
class of sources, the standard is intended to be achievable and is thus
tailored to the types of sources. Due to the breadth of source types, the
number of categories will have a great effect on the difficulties that
individual sources will face in achieving the targets. At one extreme,
standards that apply to a great variety of sources will probably be
difficult for many of the sources to achieve, while being very easy for
other sources. At the other extreme, an individual standard for every
source could be highly nuanced for the conditions of that source. From a
flexibility perspective, then, more categories of sources are desirable.
However, from the perspective of the agencies that develop the
standards, more categories will require more determinations and more
regulatory effort.
Standards vary not only in the categories of sources to which
they are applied, but also in the forms that they take. Some standards are
measured in units of emissions per unit of time or of volume, while
others are measured as emissions per unit of production or per unit of an
input, and some require specific abatement technologies.15 As Helfand
notes, sources will change their behavior based on the form of the
standard: for instance, a standard that restricts emissions of sulfur
dioxide per unit of steel production provides some incentive for
increased steel production relative to a standard that restricts emissions
per unit of time.16
II. MARKET BASED INCENTIVES
As suggested above, some sources in an emissions category are
likely to find the requirements that they face very difficult or costly to
achieve. At the same time, some sources in the category may be in
compliance before the standard even takes effect. The goal of market-
based instruments for environmental policy is to find less expensive
ways to achieve a specified environmental standard. This is done by
encouraging more reduction from sources with low abatement costs and
14. COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, Chapter 1: Air Quality and Climate, in THE TWENTY-
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1993), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/CEQ/reports/1993/chapl.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
15. Gloria E. Helfand, Standards Versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution
Restrictions, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 622 (1992).
16. Id.
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thus allowing sources with higher abatement costs to avoid some costly
reduction.
The common approach for MBI is that all sources face a price, a
concrete penalty for polluting, for each unit of pollution emitted by the
source. In response to that price, sources will either find ways to abate
(such as adjusting their production methods, installing end-of-pipe
treatment, or reducing production) or pay the price and continue to emit.
Since the decision for a source is typically not whether to pollute, but
how much to pollute, the price will most likely induce some pollution
abatement by all sources. Sources with low abatement costs will have an
incentive to abate a great deal, since the price of the pollution will be
higher than the cost of abatement for much of the pollution. In contrast,
sources with high costs will abate less and pollute more, since abatement
for much of the pollution is more expensive than paying the price.
Because abatement is reallocated from sources with high abatement costs
to those with low abatement costs, total costs of abatement are reduced
through use of MBI, while being able to achieve the same level of
emissions as under CAC. 1
7
MBI can achieve any level of emissions by adjusting the price for
pollution. At one extreme, a pollution price can be so high that a source
would cease all polluting activities and shut down rather than pay. At
zero price, the source clearly has no disincentive to emit, but it will
typically not emit infinite amounts of pollution; it will emit only as much
as its productive activities warrant. Intermediate prices will lead to
intermediate levels of emissions.
Market-based incentives can take several forms: taxes, abatement
subsidies, or marketable permits.18 A pollution tax is a pure price for
emissions: a source must pay for any units of emissions that it does not
abate. 19 In contrast, an abatement subsidy pays a source for each unit of
pollution that it abates.20 In this case, a source chooses whether an
additional unit of pollution is more desirable than the abatement
subsidy. As long as the subsidy exceeds abatement costs, a source will be
better off by abating. Finally, under a marketable permit scheme, a
source must hold permits in order to pollute; it may purchase or sell
permits as its needs require. 21 A source with high abatement costs can, in
essence, pay a source with low abatement costs to reduce its pollution so
17. See generally Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A
Survey, 30 J. ECON. LiT. 675 (1992).
18. Id. at 676.
19. Id. at 680.
20. Id. at 681.
21. Id. at 682.
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that the first source can avoid reductions. Sometimes, as with some early
trading programs, these payments involve direct negotiations between
pollution sources. 22 More recently, as with the sulfur dioxide trading
program under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, "cap-and-trade"
programs put a limit on the total level of emissions, with a permit
associated with each allowable unit of emissions.23 Sources then can buy
or sell permits. 24
Pollution taxes are more commonly used in Europe than in the
United States, though they are often not high enough to provide a strong
incentive for abatement. 25 Instead, the tax revenues are often used to
help sources pay for abatement activities. In contrast, trading pollution,
either through offset activities or through cap-and-trade programs, is the
primary market instrument in the United States.
If a pollution tax, an abatement subsidy, and a marketable
permit system produce the same price for pollution, individual sources
will respond in the same way to any of them. Thus, any of the three
instruments will result in a given source having the same level of
emissions as under another of the instruments. For a given set of sources,
then, the instruments will all lead to the same effects.
The instruments differ tremendously, though, in the flow of
money associated with them. A pollution tax requires a source to pay not
only for its abatement, but also for every unit of pollution that it still
emits. 26 In contrast, an abatement subsidy results in a source getting paid
at least as much as (and probably more than) its abatement costs. 27 The
distributional effects of marketable permits depend on the initial
allocation of the permits (or the right to emit): those who get permits
gain a valuable asset. 28 If the permits are allocated in proportion to the
emissions levels under pre-existing CAC, as seems common in U.S.
22. TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMIcs 376-77
(6th ed. 2002).
23. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 111(), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(1A) (2000).
24. Id. § 403(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b).
25. Charles W. Howe, Taxes Versus Tradable Discharge Permits: A Review in the Light of
the U.S. and European Experience, 4 ENvTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 151, 151-52 (1994); Allen
Blackman & Winston Harrington, The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries:
Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution, 9 J. ENV'T & DEV. 5, 32-35
(2000).
26. Cropper & Oates, supra note 17, at 680-81.
27. Id. at 681-82.
28. The initial distribution of the permits does not affect the ultimate allocation of the
permits if markets for the permits are competitive. If the market is not competitive, a buyer
or seller with market power can manipulate the permit price and, thus, who buys or sells
permits. Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, 99 Q.J. ECON. 753,
763-64 (1984).
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programs, all sources will be at least as well off under the permit system
as under CAC. A source will buy or sell permits only if it can profit from
the exchange. Thus, the choice of instrument can have a great effect on
the profits for any source.
Though all of the MBI lead to the same environmental effects for
any one source or set number of sources, these differences in
distributional effects among the MBI create differences in their long-run
consequences. Because the profits of pollution sources will differ under
the various MBI, these instruments influence the number of firms in an
industry. A pollution tax may encourage some sources to drop out of
business entirely, while a subsidy might encourage sources to enter
production. The lower number of sources under a pollution tax
ultimately leads to less pollution and to greater net gains to society than
other methods. 29 Also, because of their effects on firm profits, these
instruments differ in the incentives they provide for technological
innovation.30 Again, a tax and auctioned permits provide a greater
incentive than other instruments for improved abatement methods
because the incentive to find ways to reduce payments is greater under
these instruments. Thus, in the long run, the more punitive approach of a
pollution tax is likely to lead to less pollution than other MBI, due both
to its effects on profits and to its encouragement of research into new
abatement technologies.
In sum, MBI are designed to provide choice to pollution sources:
they can reduce their emissions, or they can face a price. Although the
accusation that sources can buy their way out of abatement (as Senator
Edmund Muskie said in the debate over the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, stating that "the fee is a license to pollute" 31) is technically
true, it is financially unlikely. Sources will cease any emissions for which
the price exceeds abatement costs, and a high enough price will induce
any chosen level of abatement. In other words, incentives can work quite
effectively to reduce emissions.
29. D.F. Spulber, Effluent Regulations and Long-Run Optimality, 12 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 103 (1985).
30. Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological
Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247 (1989); Chulho Jung et al.,
Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of
Policy Alternatives, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 95 (1996).
31. ENVTL. POL'Y DIv., CONG. RES. SERV., LIBR. OF CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENiS OF 1972, at 1322 (Jan. 1973) (prepared
for the use of the Committee on Public Works).
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III. CAC VERSUS MBI
A. Cost-Effectiveness
The undisputed advantage of MBI is that pollution sources can
minimize the costs of abatement associated with an environmental
target.32 Under any of the MBI, sources have choices over both how to
abate and how much to abate. If, as economic theory generally assumes,
sources will seek to minimize abatement costs (while legally meeting the
abatement requirement), MBI give them the greatest possible
opportunities to find existing low-cost ways of meeting a target and
incentives to seek new methods of reducing pollution.
These cost savings can be substantial. Tietenberg lists a variety of
studies that suggest that the ratio of costs under CAC to costs under MBI
can be as high as 24:1. 33 Schmalensee et al. estimate that the cost savings
due to the marketable permit program for the sulfur dioxide reduction
program are approximately $225 million to $375 million per year. 34 This
clear advantage of MBI suggests why they are increasingly popular.
Additionally, MBI are more likely than standards to provide
greater incentives for technological innovation. 35 While a standard
provides an incentive to innovate in order to reduce pollution abatement
costs, the cost associated with pollution due to MBI provides an
additional incentive absent with a standard. In contrast, Wagner argues
that technological innovation from MBI is likely to be much easier once
standards are already in place.36 That is, it is easier to innovate after an
initial step has been taken than if markets started with no requirements
in place. 37 For continued innovation, though, MBI are likely to dominate
standards.
One limitation deserves to be mentioned here. As pollution
levels approach zero, abatement costs are likely to become very high
regardless of regulatory approach, as all measures for abatement would
need to be taken. Although the desirability of cost savings from MBI is
greatest in these conditions, they may be least available.
32. See generally Wallace E. Oates et al., The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A
Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1233 (1989).
33. TIETENBERG, supra note 22, at 74.
34. Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
Trading, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 53, 64.
35. Milliman & Prince, supra note 30, at 247; Jung et al., supra note 30, at 95.
36. Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
83, 105-07.
37. Id. at 106.
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B. Environmental Effectiveness
Environmental regulations, of course, are designed to provide
environmental protection. Several differences in the effects of CAC and
MBI lead to potential problems: the allowance, under MBI, that sources
will not emit as they would under CAC; the need for increased
measurement of emissions under MBI; and the differing effects of these
approaches under uncertainty.
1. Spatial/Temporal Effects
Reduction of damages is the ultimate measure of the
effectiveness of an environmental policy. Damages are usually
dependent on timing and location: on the transport and transformations
of pollutants before they impose damages, on the proximity of the source
to the site of the damages, on meteorological conditions at the time of
emission, and on the number and sensitivity of those facing the
damages. (Greenhouse gases are a prominent exception. Where they are
emitted has no effect on their contribution to climate change.) In other
words, not only do total emissions matter, but the spatial and temporal
distribution of emissions affects the levels of damages at the affected
receptor points.
Two separate but related issues arise. One is whether the same
ambient standard is appropriate for all locations. This issue, while
affected by the choice of MBI or CAC, is not central to the differences
between them, since either may be used to achieve whatever standard is
put in place for different areas. The second issue is whether MBI and
CAC will lead to the same environmental effects, since MBI are likely to
lead to a different allocation of emissions among sources than do CAC.
The differences in allocations can, under some circumstances, lead to
differences in environmental quality.
For instance, consider one source of emissions with high control
costs, and a second with low control costs. If the two sources are located
next to each other, their emissions will mix, and the source of emissions
does not matter. As a result, if the first source abates less than the second
source in response to MBI, the pollution damages are the same as would
result from both sources meeting the same standard under CAC. If, on
the other hand, one source is located at great distance from the other,
then, when the first source pollutes more under MBI than under CAC,
environmental quality will worsen around or downwind from it. In
contrast, environmental quality will improve around the second source
as it abates more. Environmental quality now differs between CAC and
MBI because of the spatial distribution of emissions. A similar argument
Spring 2005]
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can be made if emissions can be "banked" for future use or "borrowed"
from the future for current use.
This problem has long been recognized in the environmental
economics literature. 38 When spatial or temporal effects matter, an MBI
plan could mitigate the problem by tailoring the price to the sum of
marginal damages that it causes at all affected locations. In other words,
instead of having one price for all sources, prices should differ for
different sources. Alternatively, under CAC, a standard can be identified
for each source. (If a uniform standard is used, all sources will reduce
their emissions, but these reductions may not occur where they are most
needed.) Since both MBI and CAC require either a price or a quantity to
be calculated individually for each pollution source, neither system is
inherently simpler than the other.
A major difference between MBI and CAC, with potentially
major effects, is that MBI can lead to a concentration of emissions in
areas where sources have high abatement costs, while CAC forces
abatement across all sources. MBI, by giving sources a choice over their
abatement levels, allow for the possibility of this concentration of
emissions, a possibility that CAC does not permit. If emissions do
become concentrated under MBI, the location of the concentration
becomes very important. If the area is especially sensitive to emissions,
due, for example, to high pre-existing environmental damages or
especially sensitive or large populations or habitats, then the resulting
"hot spot" exacerbates the previous problems. It is also possible that the
increased emissions might occur in areas with high assimilative capacity
for the pollutant or areas that are otherwise relatively insensitive to
damages. While any degradation in environmental quality is
undesirable, these areas can absorb the additional harm relatively easily.
Thus, the relationship between high abatement costs (and thus increased
emissions) and the subsequent level of damages will affect the
consequences of the choice of MBI versus CAC.
Stavins not only shows that a positive correlation between high
abatement costs and high damages (that is, the hot spots scenario)
reduces the advantages of MBI, but he also argues that these scenarios
are likely to exist, possibly more likely than the scenario of higher
emissions where the environment can absorb it. 39 For instance, cities,
with their high population concentrations, are likely to suffer more from
additional pollution than rural areas. Their high concentration of
38. See, e.g., W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control
Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972).
39. Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 218, 229-30 (1996).
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industrial and mobile sources also makes reducing emissions more
difficult. For a temporal example, warm, sunny days both are likely to
increase ozone (since ozone formation is aided by sunlight) and to
increase people's exposure to this pollutant, since these conditions
encourage people to be outside.
In practice, MBI sometimes address this problem by requiring
that air quality goals be met in all places, by limiting the region in which
pollution permits can be traded, or by requiring that the source selling
permits abate more than the source buying permits can increase its
emissions. 4° In one prominent case -trading of sulfur dioxide emissions
permits under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 199041 -spatial effects
are ignored, and a source anywhere in the United States can buy or sell
permits from any other source in the United States. Additionally,
because pollution permits can be "banked" (saved for the future),
emissions in the future may be greater than the number of permits made
available in the future.42 (Emissions cannot violate the National Ambient
Air Quality Standard for sulfur dioxide, however. As a result, while
ambient pollution may differ by time or locale, no locale at any time
should have sulfur dioxide levels higher than that standard.)
Empirical evidence suggests that, where spatial effects matter,
MBI are not necessarily cheaper than CAC in achieving ambient
standards. Tietenberg summarized empirical studies that compare
emissions permits to CAC for spatially differentiated pollutants. In almost
half the studies referenced, uniform standards had lower control costs than
MBI. 43 Oates, Portney, and McGartland found that standards led to
almost the equivalent net benefits as MBI in their study of Baltimore, in
part because standards led to greater-than-required air quality at some
monitoring locations. 44 Achieving an air quality goal everywhere
inevitably leads to excess achievement at some places. In contrast, the
financial benefits associated with MBI led sources to trade any excess
gains, and standards were exactly met everywhere. 45 O'Ryan similarly
discovered higher overall emissions under an ambient permit system
than under a CAC approach for Santiago, Chile. 46 He found that, when
40. Thomas H. (Tom) Tietenberg, Tradeable Permits for Pollution Control When Emission
Location Matters: What Have We Learned?, 5 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 95, 98-110 (1995).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2000).
42. Id. § 7586(0(2).
43. THOMAS H. (TOM) TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY 68-69 (1985).
44. Oates et al., supra note 32, at 1239-40.
45. Id. at 1234-35.
46. Raul E. O'Ryan, Cost-Effective Policies to Improve Urban Air Quality in Santiago, Chile,
31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 302, 310-11 (1996).
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the systems were adjusted so they achieved the same environmental
quality, the cost savings of the ambient permit scheme were small. 47
Thus, even if MBI are designed to ensure adequate environmental
quality at all locations, they lead to different environmental outcomes
and may not in fact be less expensive than CAC.
In sum, when space or time matters for emissions, both a
uniform MBI approach and CAC have advantages and flaws. CAC has
the potential advantage of ensuring reductions in emissions from all
regulated sources, while MBI allow the flexibility that reduces costs.
Under MBI, the risk remains that emissions may not drop from some
sources, and hot spots may remain. This concern has led some to worry
about environmental inequities from marketable permit programs that
might disproportionately affect poor or minority populations.48 If
ambient quality requirements exist in all places and are well monitored,
then hot spots can be avoided, and (perhaps limited) cost savings can be
achieved. Nevertheless, CAC is more likely to avoid the hot spots
problem than uniform MBI.
2. Monitoring and Enforcement
Understanding environmental impacts requires the ability to
measure them. Monitoring emissions levels under either CAC or MBI is
rarely easy, but monitoring under MBI may be more difficult.49 For a
price of each unit of pollution to be an effective incentive for a pollution
source to abate, the source must believe that each unit of pollution
subject to that price will be measured accurately. If pollution is only
measured occasionally, a source can argue that its emissions were low or
zero during the time that it was not monitored, and it does not need to
pay for unmeasured pollution. In China and Poland, for instance,
emissions are primarily self-reported; Blackman and Harrington note
that the probability of underreporting being detected and punished is
low.5 ° The effective price for pollution thus may be much lower than the
actual price, and actual emissions may be higher than expected. It is
argued that continuous monitoring has contributed to the success of the
47. Id. at 308-09.
48. Rachel Brasso Razon, Comment, What Is Good for the Market, Can Be Bad for the
Health: Emissions Trading Under SCAQMD's Rule 1610 and the Unjust Environmental Effects,
29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539, 541 (1999); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do
Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 111, 116-19 (1999).
49. Blackman & Harrington, supra note 25, at 12-16.
50. Id. at 220-21, 225.
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sulfur dioxide trading program.51 Meanwhile, the absence of continuous
monitoring has led the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Office of
the Inspector General to express concerns over the environmental
effectiveness of some state emissions trading programs. 52
The CAC measures of emissions are commonly based on a rate
of emissions (per unit of time or per unit of an input or output). In this
case, if emissions are monitored irregularly, a source will be found either
in compliance or out of compliance at that time, based on its behavior at
that time. While the source may still not be liable for its pollution when it
is not monitored, it is more likely to face full consequences for its
behavior at the time of monitoring. Blackman and Harrington note that
indirect and intermittent monitoring methods "appear to have been
fairly effective in ensuring compliance in the United States and
Europe." 53 Thus, accurate monitoring of emissions is likely to be more
important for MBI than for CAC. It is more likely that intermittent
monitoring under CAC will lead to sources achieving the standard than
that intermittent monitoring under MBI will lead to an accurate
measurement of emissions. As a result, environmental quality goals may
be more likely to be met under CAC than under MBI if monitoring is
identical between the two scenarios. Cole and Grossman argue that CAC
made sense for reducing air pollution in the 1970s, when the Clean Air
Act was originally passed, because monitors for ambient quality were
scarce, and monitors for emissions were "in an even less satisfactory
state than ambient concentration monitoring." 54
Alternatively, increased monitoring can be put into place for
MBI. While better monitoring will improve the performance of MBI, it
comes at potentially considerable expense. For instance, the equipment
required for the continuous monitoring of emissions under the sulfur
dioxide trading program in the United States has an annual average cost
of about $124,000.55 While the cost reductions from trading in that
program appear to exceed the costs of the monitoring equipment, the
high costs of monitoring in other cases may exceed the benefits of MBI
relative to CAC.
Several authors have argued that developing countries in
particular are not ready for MBI, based in part on the lack of institutions
51. Stavins, supra note 5, at 80.
52. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 8, at iii-iv.
53. Blackman & Harrington, supra note 25, at 14.
54. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command and Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, WIs. L. REv. 887, 919 (1999).
55. Schmalensee et al., supra note 34, at 55.
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to ensure adequate monitoring and enforcement.5 6 Blackman and
Harrington note the existence of design flaws in pollution taxes used in
Poland and China, and a lack of political interest in changing those
designs to improve the programs. 57 Bell and Russell cite lack of
experience with markets and limited ability to enforce contracts (due to
legal systems that have not adequately developed to handle contract
violations) as impediments to marketable permit systems in particular. 58
In the absence of well functioning legal systems to promote compliance
with environmental policies, MBI may prove less successful than CAC in
achieving environmental targets.
It is likely that monitoring technologies will become less
expensive over time. Thus, over time, implementing MBI may become
more feasible in a wider variety of settings than those in which they are
currently used. In the meantime, the institutional feasibility of imple-
menting MBI should be considered before their use is recommended.
3. Uncertainty
Oftentimes, the benefits of environmental protection are poorly
understood and poorly measured, both scientifically and economically.
Costs may also be poorly known in advance of implementation, due to
lack of experience with methods for abatement. Articles by Weitzman,59
Adar and Griffin,60 and Stavins61 examined the effects of uncertainty in
benefits and costs on the choice of a quantity-based (CAC) instrument
(for example, a limit on total emissions, or an ambient quality standard)
or a price-based instrument (an MBI, such as a tax on emissions). Two
factors affect the choice: (1) whether small changes in pollution levels
have a greater effect on changes in benefits or costs (that is, whether
marginal benefits are steeper than marginal costs), and (2) whether small
changes in pollution tend to cause changes in benefits and costs to move
in the same direction (both increase or decrease) or in opposite directions
(one increases while the other decreases) - that is, whether marginal
benefits and costs are positively or negatively correlated.
56. Blackman & Harrington, supra note 25, at 5; Ruth Greenspan Bell & Clifford
Russell, Environmental Policy for Developing Countries, 18 ISSUES S0. & TECH., Spring 2002, at
63, 65.
57. Blackman & Harrington, supra note 25, at 29-32.
58. Bell & Russell, supra note 56.
59. Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 477-79 (1974).
60. Zvi Adar & James M. Griffin, Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollution Control
Instruments, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 178, 179 (1976).
61. Stavins, supra note 39, at 218.
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If marginal benefits and costs are not correlated at all, then the
degree of uncertainty over benefits does not affect the choice of
instrument. If a price (such as an MBI) or a quantity (such as CAC) is set
to achieve a specified level of pollution, uncertainty in benefits does not
affect the level of emissions (since those are determined either by a
source's costs or by the standard). Instead, uncertainty affects the total
level of benefits associated with the instrument.62 On the other hand,
unexpected cost levels lead to adjustments in abatement under MBI but
not under CAC. If costs are unexpectedly high, abatement will be lower
under MBI than expected, and in fact lower than the level that
maximizes net benefits. On the other hand, if costs are unexpectedly low,
MBI will lead abatement to be higher than expected and higher than the
level that maximizes net benefits. CAC will not induce additional
abatement in the case of unexpectedly low costs, while it will require
abatement expenditures not justified by the benefits of abatement if costs
are high. Thus, both systems lead to social losses when costs are
uncertain, but the sizes of those losses differ. The key factor in
determining the relative superiority of these instruments depends, in
essence, on whether it is more important to ensure emissions limits or to
give sources flexibility in the face of cost uncertainty. Marginal benefits
more steeply sloped than marginal costs support the use of CAC,
because changes in quantity lead to relatively major changes in benefits.
Getting the quantity right matters more for net benefits than reducing
costs. In contrast, if marginal costs are more steeply sloped than
marginal benefits, the increased flexibility associated with MBI is more
likely to reduce costs, and thus increase benefits, than CAC.
If marginal benefits and marginal costs are correlated,
uncertainty in marginal benefits does matter for the analysis. A positive
correlation means that unexpectedly high benefits of abatement are
associated with unexpectedly high costs, and vice versa. For a negative
correlation, unexpectedly high benefits of abatement would be
associated with unexpectedly low costs (and vice versa). A positive
correlation, according to Weitzman,63 as well as Stavins,64 provides an
extra factor in support of CAC. The increase in benefits suggests that
more abatement is socially desirable, while the increase in costs suggests
that abatement levels are not justified by the costs. Though it is unlikely
62. If the benefits of abatement are higher (lower) than expected, then net benefits to
society would be higher if abatement is increased (decreased); because the policy, and,
thus, pollution levels, do not respond to the new information, the policy leads to more
(less) pollution than the level that maximizes net benefits.
63. Weitzman, supra note 59, at 485.
64. Stavins, supra note 39, at 229.
Spring 2005]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
that these two forces would exactly counterbalance each other, a
standard is likely to be closer to the right solution. While MBI would
allow greater flexibility, it would indisputably lead to greater pollution.
In contrast, a negative correlation provides some additional support for
MBI: the increase in costs (and thus an improvement in net benefits if
abatement is reduced) is associated with a reduction in benefits (and
thus less social cost if abatement is reduced), and a price instrument
allows that flexibility. In contrast, a CAC approach would not permit the
level of abatement to change and thus would not allow for the associated
increase in net benefits.
Stavins argues that positive correlations are likely to exist, and
are more likely than negative correlations. 65 For instance, formation of
ozone, a ground-level air pollutant, is increased by sunshine and warm
temperatures. These conditions both make controlling ozone harder (that
is, they increase the costs of abatement) and encourage more people to
go outside to enjoy the weather, which exposes them to the higher ozone
concentrations (which would increase the benefits of abating the
pollution).
Mendelsohn extrapolates the analysis to reflect spatial
heterogeneity instead of uncertainty. 66 The question becomes whether an
MBI is superior to a standard when sources (which have different
abatement costs) may be located in areas with high abatement benefits
(such as cities, because many people are affected by the pollution) or low
abatement benefits (such as rural areas). If an MBI were used in these
situations, sources with high abatement costs would "buy" their way to
higher pollution levels; thus, hot spots can develop. If those sources are
in urban areas, the positive correlation between costs and benefits
suggests the greater desirability of CAG, since it would limit the ability
of these transactions to occur. If, on the other hand, the high-cost sources
are in rural areas, a price-based approach such as marketable permits
would reduce pollution in the city, where the gains from its reduction
are greatest, while the increases in rural areas would have much smaller
damages.
Inherent in these models is an information asymmetry: sources
know their costs and make their decisions on what to produce and emit,
while regulators must choose an MBI or standard without knowing
sources' costs. In this situation, when little is known in advance of
regulation of the benefits and costs associated with the regulation, a
tradeoff exists between increasing flexibility for sources' response, and
65. Id. at 226.
66. Robert Mendelsohn, Regulating Heterogeneous Emissions, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 301, 310-12 (1986).
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thus reducing costs, through use of an MBI, and increasing the assurance
of attaining an environmental quality target, through use of CAC. If
there is some knowledge of the relative responsiveness of benefits and
costs of abatement to small changes in the abatement level, as well as
whether those benefit and cost shifts are correlated with each other, then
policy makers can understand better the relative merits of the two
approaches and the approach that is more likely to increase social
welfare.
4. Environmental Effectiveness: A Summary
If the damages from emissions are unaffected by the location or
timing of emissions, if monitoring of emissions is easy, and if assuring
the ability to reduce abatement costs is more important than the effect of
small changes in emissions on environmental damages, then MBI are
superior to CAC. Under these conditions, either MBI or CAC is likely to
meet environmental goals. If environmental goals are met, the superior
cost-effectiveness of MBI makes them more attractive. However, these
conditions often do not hold. For many pollutants, spatial and temporal
effects matter greatly. For example, MBI have the potential to produce
locally hazardous "hot spots," or to allow more pollution in places or
times where damages are especially high. Monitoring technologies may
be so expensive in some cases that the potential gains from MBI may be
lost either to the monitoring equipment or to reduced environmental
effectiveness due to inadequate monitoring. Finally, MBI provide
flexibility to adjust to uncertainty in costs, but possibly at the expense of
achieving the environmental target. There is no question that MBI can
lead to environmental improvements, but they may not always be as
effective as CAC in that goal.
C. Social/Political Acceptability
Policy decisions are not based on economic efficiency alone.
Politicians and regulators are not concerned only with the aggregate
effects of a policy. They are concerned as well with the distribution of
those effects on groups of interest to them. These concerns can be related
to (at least) two factors: first, a political-economic view that policy
makers are concerned about assisting those groups who will assist them;
second, consideration of ethical factors that reflect social mores of
concern to policy makers.
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1. Distribution and Political Economy
As discussed above, the choice of regulatory instrument
influences the distribution of the costs of pollution abatement. Generally,
a pollution tax or marketable permits that must be initially purchased
are most expensive for the pollution source, followed by a pollution
standard. An abatement subsidy is likely to increase a polluter's profits.
The reverse is true for the agency that funds the subsidy or receives the
tax revenues. If marketable permits are distributed initially without cost
at the same levels as a standard, they will be less expensive for the
pollution sources than the standard but not as profitable as the
abatement subsidy. The government agency will not spend or receive
money in either case. The tax, permits, and subsidy, by leading to the
same allocation of abatement among sources, are equivalent in their
ability to minimize costs of abatement in the short run and, barring the
environmental effectiveness problems discussed above, superior to the
standard. Clearly, though, they have very different effects on the profits
of the source (and, thus, on long-run supply curves) and on the agency
that either funds the subsidy or receives the tax revenues.
Those differences in net wealth are likely to matter more than
the minimization of abatement costs, both to the sources and to the
funding/receiving agency. Both may try to influence policy makers over
the choice of environmental policy as well as the level of that policy. In
the United States, perhaps it is not a surprise that marketable permits
(distributed for no cost) are the dominant form of MBI in use.67
Marketable permits provide for reduced abatement costs compared to
CAC but do not involve large wealth transfers either from polluters or
from a government agency. In Europe, pollution taxes are more
common, but they rarely are high enough to provide a strong incentive
for abatement. 68 Instead, they are used to subsidize abatement, in
another method of reducing net wealth transfers.
The choice of regulatory instrument may have additional effects
more subtle than simple distribution. Both standards and marketable
permits may limit production and drive up price by limiting pollution. 69
This price increase via CAC provides cartel rents to the polluters and
may actually increase polluters' profits. A pollution tax, in contrast, gives
those rents to the government. Maloney and McCormick find some
evidence that a cotton dust standard increased stock market value for
67. Howe, supra note 25, at 153.
68. Id. at 152; Blackman & Harrington, supra note 25, at 39.
69. James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct
Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 139-40 (1975).
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cotton textile plants, and Prevention of Significant Deterioration rules
under the Clean Air Act did the same for nonferrous metal smelters. 70
CAC, then, may have some subtle anti-competitive effects that might
make them more acceptable for pollution sources.
The choice of regulatory instrument may also affect institutional
processes and thus influence those who seek to influence those
processes. CAC measures, which are typically composed of standards for
each industry, are likely to require more regulatory action than MBI,
which only require a total quantity of emissions (for permits) or a price
(for a tax or subsidy). The greater regulatory activity under CAC may
provide possibilities for interest group involvement that MBI do not,
both in rulemaking and in subsequent enforcement of the rules.71 Both
environmentalists and those associated with pollution sources might
prefer the greater ability to be involved in policy as ways to influence the
outcomes in their favor and as ways to show their influence in the
processes.
From a political-economic perspective, the distribution of
benefits and costs matters more than the total net benefits. 72 Because
taxes are most expensive to pollution sources, while abatement subsidies
are most expensive to regulators, CAC and marketable permits may be a
compromise on the distributional effects. In addition, both CAC and
marketable permits may limit production in an industry and thus create
some cartel profits that would not exist under a price approach. Finally,
the likelihood that CAC increases regulatory activity compared to MBI
may make the former more attractive to interest groups that want to be
politically involved. In other words, CAC may have many political
advantages over MBI.
2. Ethics
From an economic perspective, problems over environmental
goods arise because the kinds of property rights necessary for markets to
function do not apply to them. For property rights to produce effective
markets, Tietenberg suggests that three characteristics must apply:
1. Exclusivity- All benefits and costs accrued as a result of
owning and using the resources should accrue to the
70. Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99, 109-11 (1982).
71. Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TuL. L. REv. 845, 875-78 (1999).
72. Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 217
(1976).
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owner, and only to the owner, either directly or indirectly
by sale to others.
2. Transferability -All property rights should be
transferable from one owner to another in a voluntary
exchange.
3. Enforceability -Property rights should be secure from
involuntary encroachment by others. 73
For environmental goods, exclusivity rarely holds. Pollution by
one party affects others, and environmentally desirable behavior by one
person provides benefits to many others, without the others bearing any
of the burden of the behavior. Because the usual rules about property
rights cannot apply to environmental goods, it is in some ways strange
even to apply the concept of markets to them. At the root, environmental
problems raise fundamental questions about the rights to nature,
questions that must be answered before markets have any chance of
success.
A market approach to environmental goods is not universally
acceptable; some view polluting as morally indefensible, while markets
give pollution the appearance of acceptability. Kelman cites several
objections on the part of environmentalists toward the use of markets for
environmental goods. 74 First, markets imply moral neutrality toward
pollution; the environment becomes an ordinary commodity. 75 A
standard, even if it allows some pollution, provides a social
condemnation of the behavior. Secondly, motives for reducing pollution
may matter in setting public policy.76 Polluters are likely to comply with
a standard because violating it is illegal. In contrast, sources will reduce
pollution in a market setting if abatement is cheaper than polluting. If
motives matter, then acting on the basis of the law, with its implications
of right and wrong, is more acceptable to the public than acting on the
basis of finances. Finally, there may be some goods, such as family and
friendship, that should not be considered in market settings. Either the
resulting interaction provides benefits that no market can provide, or the
good has intrinsic values that cannot be traded away. Environmental
goods may fall into this category for those who consider a clean
environment a fundamental right or a part of their heritage or culture.
Beder further argues that markets are not free institutions. They are
manipulated by multinational corporations to exploit both people and
73. TIETENBERG, supra note 22, at 62.
74. Steven Kelman, Economists and the Environmental Muddle, 64 PUB. INT. 106 (1981).
75. Id. at 114-16.
76. Id. at 116-17.
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nature. 77 Including pollution in these markets will lead to further
exploitation rather than improved welfare. To the extent that these views
underlie the public's support for environmental protection, markets may
be viewed as an inappropriate approach to a fundamentally moral
problem.
Command and control measures may also be perceived as more
equitable than MBI. Under MBI, sources of pollution can, if they desire,
avoid abatement completely through payment (either explicit or, in the
case of a subsidy, in an opportunity cost sense) of a sufficient fee. Under
CAC, in contrast, all pollution sources have to abate. A major objection
to taxes on water pollution in the debate over the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 was that "the fee is a license to pollute"
and would allow polluters to buy their way out of abating. 78 Fairness in
sharing the burden of abatement may be a desirable feature of CAC
relative to MBI.79 While paying for the right to pollute certainly does not
let the polluter avoid any penalty, the act of abatement may in itself be
an important act of communality.
3. Political Economy and Ethics: Summary
From the perspective of policy makers balancing the interests of
multiple constituencies, there may be advantages for environmentalists,
pollution sources, and regulators to CAC. Environmentalists have
typically expressed skepticism about MBI because of the concern that
they are not as effective in achieving environmental goals.80 CAC may
also be desirable to them because of its ability to influence the associated
regulatory and enforcement processes. 81 Pollution sources might prefer
the possibilities for rent-seeking associated with CAC not available
under taxes or abatement subsidies, although the same rents plus
financial gains that arise with marketable permits might make that form
of MBI more appealing. 82 Regulators and interest groups may prefer
CAC over MBI because it requires more oversight, rule-making, and
bureaucracy, and thus expansion of their role.83 Thus, even if MBI have
77. Sharon Beder, Charging the Earth: The Promotion of Price-Based Measures for Pollution
Control, 16 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 51,62 (1996).
78. ENVTL. POL'Y DWv., supra note 31, at 1322.
79. Lorena Bark Malecha et al., San Francisco Bay Area Boatyards: A Case Study in
Regulating Small Polluters, 20 ENvT. AFF. 453, 467-69 (1993); Wagner, supra note 36, at 103-
04.
80. MOORE, supra note 9, at 6-8.
81. Zywicki, supra note 71, at 875-80.
82. Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 69, at 143-45.
83. Zywicki, supra note 71, at 874-900.
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lower abatement costs, CAC might provide more benefits to the interest
groups most directly affected by the regulatory choice.
The moral/ethical arguments in favor of CAC are rooted in the
idea that environmental goods are not and should not be simple market
goods. From this perspective, a moral onus should accompany pollution
and CAC is more likely to leave that onus than MBI. Additionally, CAC
is less likely to permit sources to buy their way out of a shared
abatement burden and thus promotes equity. Of course, there is an
opportunity cost when including these factors-higher abatement costs
than under MBI. The importance of this perspective to some policy
makers may explain some decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Table 1 summarizes the discussion of the factors affecting
regulatory instrument choice. The potentially most important result from
the table is that neither instrument dominates the other on all factors.
Especially when environmental effectiveness is considered, MBI
(especially as typically implemented) may in some cases be inferior to
CAC. Thus, instituting MBI for all environmental policies may well have
adverse consequences on many measures.
Market-based incentives will always have the advantage of
reducing abatement costs, but they will always have the disadvantage of
turning environmental protection into just another market good, in
disregard of some people's attitudes toward the environment. On most
other counts, the superiority of one instrument over another depends on
circumstances. For instance, if spatial or temporal effects are not
significant (as, for instance, with greenhouse gases, for which the
location of their emissions is irrelevant to their effects), the potential for
hot spots with MBI is reduced, and the environmental performance of
MBI is likely to be equivalent to CAC (and less expensive). As
monitoring technology improves, MBI may become more feasible. Better
monitoring and emissions modeling may even assist with spatial/
temporal problems. For example, adequate measuring of ambient
environmental quality can be used to detect hot spots, and emissions
modeling can determine the likely sources, and thus be used to
recommend policies to avoid hot spots. If these hurdles can be solved, it
may be possible for MBI to evolve to overcome many of the efficiency
hurdles.
However, if MBI are not designed for ambient environmental
quality or if monitoring and enforcement continue to be expensive or
irregular, CAC may be more effective in some circumstances for
achieving environmental improvements. While reduced abatement costs
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should certainly be sought, the environmental targets do not deserve to
be ignored in the process.
The distributional issues associated with the choice of MBI or
CAC can perhaps be overcome by the use of marketable permits. If the
permits are distributed without cost in the same manner that CAC
would require, then the buyers and sellers of permits would benefit, but
with no cost relative to CAC. On the other hand, the increased use of the
market might reduce the role of the regulatory agencies and give interest
groups less access to the regulatory process as well, perhaps not to the
pleasure of either party.
If the efficiency hurdles of MBI can be overcome with
technological advances, it may be possible for the moral and ethical
hurdles to be addressed. To the extent that lack of faith in markets for
improving people's lives is the root of the ethical concerns over MBI, 84
then demonstrating that markets can work effectively for environmental
protection may reduce those concerns. Indeed, if MBI reduce the costs of
abatement, then arguing for lower pollution levels should become easier.
Since those who are likely to have ethical objections to MBI are likely as
well to want less pollution, the latter possibility may mitigate their
objection to the former.
At this time, the superiority of MBI as commonly designed is far
from assured. Until monitoring technology improves and the "hot spots"
problem can be avoided, the superiority of MBI relative to CAC is in
question. The distributional, and thus political economy, effects can
partially be addressed through the choice among MBI, but the moral and
ethical concerns over markets for environmental goods may be harder to
overcome. While there are certainly cases where MBI are good choices,
CAC still deserves its place in the environmental policy toolbox.
84. See generally Beder, supra note 77.
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Table 1: Factors Affecting the Choice of MBI & CAC
FACTORS AFFECTING THE INSTRUMENT IT TENDS TO
CHOICE FAVOR
Cost-Effectiveness MBI
Long-Run Equilibrium & MBI
Technological Innovation
Environmental Effectiveness
Spatial/Temporal Effects Ambiguous
Monitoring and Enforcement CAC
Uncertainty Ambiguous
Other Factors
Distribution & Political Economy Mixed
Ethics CAC
